H and B Carriers and Capital General Corporation v. Utah Securities Division and the Department of Business Regulation : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1992
H and B Carriers and Capital General Corporation
v. Utah Securities Division and the Department of
Business Regulation : Brief in Opposition to
Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; David N. Sonnenreich; Assistant Attorney General.
David H. Day; Phillip B. Shell; Day & Barney.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, H and B Carriers v. Utah Securities Division, No. 920180.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4119
DOCUMENT BWEF. 
KFU 
DOCKET NO. J ^ — ' 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the Following 
Issuers, their Securities, 
Affiliates or Successors, 
and/or Entities subsequently 
organized by them, including 
H & B Carriers, Inc., et al., 
Capital General Corporation, 
Petitioners and Appellants 
vs 
Utah Securities Division, and 
the Department of Business 
Regulation, 
Respondents and Appellees 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
CASE # 920180-SC 
CASE # 910196-CA 
RULE 29 PRIORITY #13 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari Review 
of a Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Dated February 10, 1992 
David H. Day 
Phillip B. Shell 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
R. Paul Van Dam - 3312 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
David N. Sonnenreich - 4917 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
Fair Business Enforcement Unit 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
F I L E D 
MAY 0 1992 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the Following ] 
Issuers, their Securities, ] 
Affiliates or Successors, ) 
and/or Entities subsequently ] 
organized by them, including ] 
H & B Carriers, Inc., et al., ] 
Capital General Corporation, ] 
Petitioners and Appellants ] 
vs. 
Utah Securities Division, and 
the Department of Business ] 
Regulation, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
) BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
) FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
CASE # 920180-SC 
) CASE # 910196-CA 
| RULE 29 PRIORITY #13 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari Review 
of a Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Dated February 10, 1992 
R. Paul Van Dam - 3312 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
David N. Sonnenreich - 4917 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
Fair Business Enforcement Unit 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
David H. Day 
Phillip B. Shell 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT; 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS; 1 
ARGUMENT 4 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY DENIED A 
NEARLY IDENTICAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, 
WITH RESPECT TO POINTS I AND II (OF THE CURRENT 
PETITION1, IN THE AMENITY CASE; 4 
THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. ALSO KNOWN 
AS ISSUE PRECLUSION. BARS CAPITAL GENERAL 
CORPORATION FROM RELITIGATING THE SAME ISSUES THAT 
WERE DECIDED AGAINST IT IN THE AMENITY CASE; . . . 
POINTS I AND II OF THE CURRENT PETITION DO NOT 
RAISE THE SORT OF "SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS" 
REQUIRED FOR A GRANT OF CERTIORARI UNDER UTAH RULE 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 46; 8 
POINT III OF THE CURRENT PETITION, PERTAINING TO 
THE AWARD OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS BY THE DISTRICT COURT, 
IS BASED UPON ALLEGED ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT. AND 
NOT BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. AND IS THEREFORE NOT 
A VALID INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR A CERTIORARI PETITION; . 10 
CONCLUSION 11 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
A. CASES 
Capital General Corporation v. Utah Department of Business 
Regulations, Securities Division, 111 P. 2d 494 
(Utah App. 1989) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
In re H & B Carriers, et al., Capital General Corporation v. 
Department of Business Regulations, Utah Securities 
Division, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 
(Utah App. Feb. 10, 1992) 1/3,5 
Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935) . . . 4,5,6,9,10 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988) 6 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 
451, 454 (Utah App. 1988) 6 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 33 n.2 
(Utah April 7, 1992) 11 
B. STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15) (c) (ii) (1989) 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15) (d) (i) (1989) 9 
C. OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 8 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION IN 
LOWER COURT: 
This case involves an order by the Securities Advisory Board 
of the Utah Division of Securities (the "Division") that affects 
trading in the stock of approximately forty-seven (47) corporations 
formed by the Petitioner, Capital General Corporation ("CGC"). 
That Order was challenged by CGC in a District Court proceeding. 
Judge Russon dismissed the District Court case and awarded Rule 11 
sanctions (in the amount of $1395) against CGC on the grounds that 
CGC's claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
The District Court found that the parties and the issues were 
identical in this case and in the case of Capital General 
Corporation v. Utah Department of Business Regulationsr Securities 
Division, 777 P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1989) (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Amenity" case because of the name of the corporation whose 
stock was at issue in that case), which was fully and finally 
litigated. The case was then appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which upheld both the Division's actions and the District 
Court's dismissal and sanctions award. See, In re H & B Carriers. 
et al.. Capital General Corporation v. Department of Business 
Regulations, Utah Securities Division, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 
App. Feb. 10, 1992). A Petition for Rehearing was Filed by CGC on 
February 24, 1992, and was denied on March 9, 1992. CGC then filed 
its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 8, 1992. 
Statement of the Facts: 
During 1986, Capital General Corporation created at least 
forty-seven (47) "shell" corporations1, including Amenity, Inc. 
(which is the subject of the Amenity case), H & B Carriers, Inc. 
(originally known as "Y Travel," which is the lead corporation on 
the full caption of the present case), and some forty-five (45) 
others (which are all named in, and affected by, the present case). 
None of the forty-seven corporations registered their stock with 
the Division. CGC then gave small portions of the stock in each 
corporation to a large number of recipients, with CGC retaining the 
overwhelming majority of the stock in each shell corporation. The 
effect of these gifts was to make each shell corporation into a de 
facto publicly held corporation, bypassing various state and 
federal securities laws pertaining to registration of initial 
public offerings, and making the shell corporations much more 
valuable.2 
The Division found that CGC's gifts were not "good faith 
gifts" within the meaning of the Utah Securities Act, which 
excludes good faith gifts from the definition of offers and sales 
of securities, because the intent in making the gifts was to 
lA "shell" corporation is one that has substantially no assets 
and conducts substantially no business. 
2Publicly held shell corporations can be sold for significant 
amounts of money because they can be merged with operating 
businesses that are not publicly held corporations in such a way 
that the resulting entity is a publicly held corporation that bears 
the name of the operating business. This technique, known as a 
reverse merger, allows an operating business to become a public 
corporation without going through the federal and state 
registration requirements for an initial public stock offering. 
For example, Amenity, Inc., which was originally capitalized by CGC 
for $2,000, was sold in a reverse merger for $25,000. 
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circumvent the disclosure requirements of the Utah Securities Act.3 
The Division also found that CGC's gifts were "for value" because 
the value of shell corporation stock held by CGC greatly increased 
as a result of giving away a small portion of the stock in each 
corporation. Based upon those findings, and pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 61-1-14(3), the Division ordered that none of the 
corporations could claim any transactional exemptions from the Utah 
Securities Act's registration requirements/ In other words, 
before anybody could trade any stock belonging to any one of the 
forty-seven corporations, that corporation would have to register 
its stock with the Division.5 
3CGC argues that there is evidence of subjective good faith 
because CGC's president testified at the administrative hearing 
that, on an unknown date, he talked to an unknown person at the 
Utah Division of Securities and made a general inquiry as to 
whether people who give gifts of stock need to register the gifts. 
He did not disclose any details about CGC's plan, its scope or 
nature, or the fact that the goal of the gifts was to create de 
facto public corporation. The Utah Court of Appeals found that 
"[b]ecause this evidence is so general, vague and uncorroborated, 
it has little weight or relevance." 180 Ut. Adv. Rep. at 24. 
4Action was first brought with respect to Amenity, Inc., and 
then thereafter with respect to the remaining shell corporations in 
a separate case. The Amenity case remained at least one stage 
ahead of the other case (which is the case currently before the 
court). 
5Contrary to CGC's assertion in its Petition, the Division's 
actions do not permanently prevent any stock from becoming fully 
alienable. All that is necessary is for the corporation in 
questxon to register its stock with the Division. Since CGC 
controls the overwhelming majority of the stock in the corporations 
at issue, it could easily elect boards of directors who would 
register each corporation. Naturally, the Division may condition 
registration on adequate disclosure and compliance with Utah blind 
pool laws, and may deny registration on the basis of fraud, etc. 
To date, however, none of the forty-seven corporations has 
attempted to register, although a successful registration would 
allow shareholders to sell their stock. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has already denied a nearly identical 
petition for writ of certiorari. with respect to points I and 
II (of the current petition), in the Amenity case: 
The Utah Court of Appeals handed down the Amenity decision on 
July 3, 1989. On August lf 1989, CGC filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari. Certiorari was denied on September 12, 1989.6 The 
petition raised the following point: 
Point One: A Writ of Certiorari should be granted 
because the Court of Appeals decided a question of law in 
conflict with a prior decision of this court and 
construed the plain words of the controlling statute 
contrary to their usual and customary meaning. 
This point is essentially identical to the first two points 
raised in the current petition: 
Point I: A Writ of Certiorari should be granted because 
the Court of Appeals has ignored the clear meaning of a 
statute and thus sanctioned an invalid use of a statute. 
Point II: A Writ of Certiorari should be granted to 
determine whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
in conflict with a prior decision of this Court, namely 
Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935). 
It would be anomalous if the Supreme Court were to grant 
certiorari in this case, after denying a certiorari petition from 
the same party, alleging the same errors and based upon the same 
facts. That is particularly true give the nature of the current 
Court of Appeals decision, which can be fairly summarized as 
follows: "This case is factually indistinguishable from Amenityf 
6The Supreme Court case number for the Amenity case is 890339-
SC. 
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and therefore is bound by the Amenity decision as a matter of 
precedent." What CGC is challenging in its current petition is not 
really the current Court of Appeals decision (except in so far as 
it asserts that the present case is identical to Amenity^, but 
rather the earlier Amenity decision.7 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue 
preclusion, bars Capital General Corporation from relitigating 
the same issues that were decided against it in the Amenity 
case; 
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon dismissed this case at the 
district court level because the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
bars Capital General Corporation from relitigating the issues 
decided against it in the Amenity case. The Court of Appeals chose 
not to directly address the issue in its opinion/ but this Court 
would have to address it if certiorari is granted. 
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, exists 
when there was a prior action where: (1) the issues are identical; 
(2) the judgment is final; (3) the issues were fully and 
competently litigated; and (4) the party precluded from 
7Indeed, the question of whether the Utah Supreme Court case 
of Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935) applies was 
only analyzed in the Amenity decision. See, 777 P.2d at 497, n.3. 
The current Court of Appeals decision makes no reference at all to 
the Andrews case. 
8The Court of Appeals assumed, arguendo, that collateral 
estoppel did not exist for purposes of analysis, probably because 
that court found it easier to base its decision on the grounds that 
Amenity is binding precedent. See, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. The 
issue remains, however, as a valid alternative theory on which to 
uphold the results reached by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the 
Court of Appeals must have presumed the existence of collateral 
estoppel, because it upheld the District Court's award of Rule 11 
sanctions, which was based upon collateral estoppel. 
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relitigating the issues was a party to the prior action. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988); Trimble Real Estate v. 
Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah App. 1988). 
There is no doubt as to requirements (2), (3) and (4). 
Amenity was fully, competently, and finally litigated, and Capital 
General Corporation, the sole appellant in this case, was the sole 
appellant in Amenity.9 The only question is whether the issues in 
this case are the same as those in Amenity. 
The Court of Appeals determined in Amenity that Capital 
General Corporation's scheme of "giving away" stock in order to 
create publicly held companies constitutes a sale of a security, 
777 P.2d at 496-97; that Capital General Corporation failed to meet 
its burden of showing that its transfers were "good faith gifts," 
777 P.2d at 498; that the Securities Advisory Board has statutory 
authority to deny or suspend secondary trading in the unregistered 
stock held by Capital General Corporation, 777 P.2d at 498-99; and 
that the case of Andrews v. Chase is not applicable. Those are the 
same substantive and legal issues raised in this case. 
Capital General Corporation has admitted that "the Amenity 
facts and the facts of the present case are identical in all 
respects, the basic difference being that Mr. Yeaman was 
unavailable to testify in the Amenity matter [on the issue of good 
9Much of CGC's petition is filled with expressions of concern 
for "innocent" shareholders, such as those who received "gifts" of 
stock in the various corporations. Interestingly, none of those 
shareholders, and none of the corporations that are directly 
affected by the Division's order, have ever chosen to get involved 
in this litigation. The only party on the petitioner's side is the 
petitioner itself. 
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faith] . . . ." See, Capital General Corporation's Memorandum in 
Support of Petition for Review, at 4. 
Mr. Yeaman's testimony is irrelevant because it goes to the 
issue of good faith, an issue that was fully and finally litigated 
in Amenity.10 The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not allow 
an issue to be relitigated simply because counsel wish to present 
different testimony in the second trial. The testimony presented 
by Mr. Yeaman is as relevant to the good faith issue in Amenity as 
it is to this case, and it was Capital General Corporation's burden 
to put that evidence on in the first case.11 Capital General 
Corporation must raise new issues, not merely the specter of new 
testimony concerning already decided issues, in order to avoid 
collateral estoppel; with the exception of Point III, relating to 
the District Court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, Capital 
General Corporation has failed to raise a single issue that was not 
raised and resolved in the Amenity proceeding. Should certiorari 
10This case is so closely tied factually to the Amenity case 
that Amenity, Inc. is discussed at length in the Securities 
Advisory Board's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order. Likewise, the Court of Appeals actually 
referred, in the Amenity decision, to the corporations whose stock 
is at issue in this case: "Additional evidence of CGC's economic 
self-interest and its lack of gratuitous intentions is shown by the 
fact that CGC similarly converted at least thirty other private 
companies using the same method employed here." Ill P.2d at 498 
(emphasis added). 
uThe fact that Mr. Yeaman was "unavailable" to testify in the 
Amenity case is irrelevant. Mr. Yeaman is the President of Capital 
General Corporation, and it was Capital General Corporation's 
responsibility to either ensure his availability, obtain a 
continuance, or introduce similar evidence from other witnesses. 
A failure to present all of your evidence in the first proceeding 
is no defense to a claim of collateral estoppel in a subsequent 
proceeding. 
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be granted, all aspects of this case, except for the Rule 11 
sanctions issue, will have to be decided against Capital General 
Corporation on the basis of collateral estoppel. Since collateral 
estoppel would prevent the Court from reaching the merits of the 
Amenity decision, there is no benefit to granting a writ of 
certiorari. 
Points I and II of the current petition do not raise the sort 
of "special and important reasons" required for a grant of 
certiorari under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46; 
Setting aside the problem of reaching the merits of CGC's 
arguments due to the collateral estoppel issue, CGC has failed to 
raise concerns sufficient to warrant a writ of certiorari. Rule 46 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a writ of 
certiorari "will be granted only for special and important 
reasons." The rule then goes on to give examples of such reasons. 
Point I of CGC's petition asserts that the Court of Appeals' 
reading of the Utah Securities Act is flawed in several respects, 
but it fails to assert that "the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of 
the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Rule 46 (emphasis 
added). In essence, Point I is simply a dispute over the meaning 
of statutory provisions, which it says "clearly" mean one thing, 
but which the Court of Appeals (and the Division) say clearly mean 
something else. Actually, the Court of Appeals' decision in 
Amenity is decidedly pedestrian. All that it says is that 
sometimes transactions that appear to be gifts of securities really 
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should be deemed to be sales when the giver receives something of 
value as a result of giving the giftf and that the Division may 
deny a corporation access to any exemptions from stock registration 
requirements when it used such non-gifts as a means to evade the 
registration requirements of Utah law. Unless the Utah Supreme 
Court is intent on micro-managing the decisions of the Court of 
Appeals, it should leave such an unremarkable decision undisturbed. 
Point II of the petition admittedly involves an allegation 
that the Court of Appeals decided Amenity in a way that is in 
conflict with a Utah Supreme Court opinion, namely Andrews. Even 
a cursory look at the Andrews case and subsequent legislation shows 
that Andrews both lacks precedential value and is factually 
distinguishable. 
Andrews is a 1935 case that involved gifts of assessable 
stock, which the Utah Supreme Court held were gifts, and not sales. 
Since 1935 the legislature has enacted two relevant changes to the 
securities laws. One change was to explicitly call a purported 
gift of assessable stock an "offer or sale." See, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-13(15)(c)(ii) (1989). The other change was to state that a 
"good faith gift" does not constitute an offer or sale. See, Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15)(d)(i) (1989). Both changes occur in a 
portion of the Utah Securities Act that attempts to give examples 
of what is an offer or sale, and what is not. In essence, the 
legislature has said that some gifts are made in good faith, 
without reciprocal value to the giver, while other "gifts" are not 
made in good faith and are sales, a category that explicitly 
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includes gifts of assessable stock. 
Even if Andrews retained any precedential value, the case is 
factually distinguishable. As the Court of Appeals noted in 
Amenity; 
In Andrews, the gift of stock was made with the mere 
expectation of future, speculative benefits in the form 
of assessments the donees would voluntarily choose to 
pay. See Andrews, 49 P.2d at 942. Here, the disposition 
of the Amenity, Inc. shares created an immediate, actual 
benefit to CGC in that it now owned substantial shares in 
a public company which, but for the disposition, would be 
a private company. 
Amenity, 777 P.2d at 497-498 n.3. In its petition, CGC argues that 
this is a specious distinction because creating a public company 
only creates a potential for benefit that depends "upon the further 
efforts of the givers (infusion of assets, work to make the company 
viable, etc.)." Petition, at 17. The facts of Amenity show that 
CGC's assertions are simply wrong. Amenity, Inc. was worth $2,000 
when it was first incorporated as a privately held shell 
corporation by the name of "Y Travel, Inc." Once Y Travel, Inc. 
became a de facto publicly held shell corporation it became a 
viable merger partner for a privately held business, without the 
infusion of any additional assets or work. In fact, such a merger 
took place to form Amenity, Inc., and CGC received $25,000 for its 
stock in Y Travel, Inc. 
Point III of the current petition, pertainina to the award of 
Rule 11 sanctions by the District Court, is based upon alleged 
error by the trial court, and not by the Court of Appeals, and 
is therefore not a valid independent basis for a certiorari 
petition: 
The Court recently made the following remark in a footnote: 
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We take this opportunity to remind the bar that when 
exercising our certiorari jurisdiction granted by section 
78-2-2(3)(a), we review a decision of the court of 
appeals, not of the trial court. . . . To restate the 
matter: We do not grant certiorari to review de novo the 
trial court's decision. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 33 n.2 (Utah April 7, 
1992) (citations omitted). 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals applied an "abuse of 
discretion" standard, and found that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding Rule 11 sanctions against CGC. In 
its petition, CGC has not argued that the Court of Appeals applied 
the wrong standard; rather, CGC has only argued that the District 
Court abused its discretion. This is nothing but an attempt to 
have this Court review the District Court's decision de novo, 
contrary to the language in Butterfield. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court should deny the writ of certiorari 
sought by Capital General Corporation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of May, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID N. SONNENREICH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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